Take from the altar of the ancients, not the ashes, but the fire. – Gustav Mahler
The verdict of the Appellate Division regarding the murder of President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and members of his family is an important milestone in our political and judicial history. The men accused of the murder went through our entire judicial system, from the District Court to the Appellate Division. Some of the individuals initially accused were acquitted. Those who were convicted had the chance to present all suitable defences, and were accorded all the rights which our state gives defendants in criminal prosecutions.
For all those individuals who were affected by the gruesome murders, one hopes that this comes as some salve to the personal wound that will undoubtedly haunt them the rest of their lives. The psychological trauma that comes from the assassination of loved ones, and the dislocation that comes from seeing our elders and guardians lying bloodied and lifeless, is unparalleled. We hope the pain that they carry around every day is a little lighter today
Only Rumi can claim that Zia tried to save Bangabandhu! You are not in middle of nowhere. You stand firmly where your Madam does.
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I would say the comments by the bloggers in the so-called live chat on the verdict was a disappointment, except for some insights by Zafar Sobhan. Most of them were unneccessarily chatty, even making light of things, commenting upon other comments. Naeem’s near-equivalence of various killings were apalling, and Asif’s comment on “eye for an eye” was totally unfounded. As far as I can see, this was a historical verdict for the whole nation whether one cares for Mujib or not. This will bring back an ethical purposefulness to the nation that we lost on August 15 and lost more and more through the continuing saga (the indemnity law, surely the darkest piece for any nation, and rewarding the killers by diplomatic posts by all later governments, and encouraging the killers to continue behahing brashly and arrogantly as long as they stayed in the country). I would say for all that Zia, Ershad and the subsequent BNP was equally culpable (I am not saying Zia was involved, but as some people say he warned Mujib about a plot, why didnt he go down and stop it, and his behavior all throughout was very mysterious, although there was no mystery in rewarding the killers, but what is certainly most mischievous is how the 1996 Investigation Officer of the case, Mr Akhand, was fired from his job by BNP when they came
to power. All in all, BNP has answering to do in keeping this dark stain on our national polity). In case, taking lives
is always a difficult choice, and whether there is hardcore AL or anti-AL, they should all feel good as citizens that
Hasina allowed the trail to be conducted in the most transparent and judicious way. Its a great victory for law and
constitutionality. Makes me proud. One more thing: reading once more, in the Daily Star, how Mujib was killed, I think he lived like a lion and died like one, as did his wife and other members of his family, not begging for their lives but going down with a glow. Its the attackers, the killers, who came in shrouded in darkness, remained dark at heart, and kept the nation blackened until yesterday.
eye for eye (Asif)
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As I said on your website: Probably the most best thing I read/heard about the verdict all day. Thank you, Rumi bhai.
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Rumi bhaiTacit, (I blame it on the new look and redirection of posts for thinking that the post was by Rumi bhai… apologies)Thanks for reinforcing these valid points. It is hard to believe the conversations between Sheikh Mujib and the chiefs of defense and para-milita force. I wonder what was he thinking when he got the negative response to his SOS call from his trusted ones!
While I admire your hint on bringing others into question, I am not convinced by the “Bangladesh rejecting the perpetrators” theory. I remember you took the latest army regime’s ambassador appointments as “gifts” to, not “exile” of the appointees.
Even though Col. Syed Faruq Rehman could shape Bangladesh’s political climate in his favor at all, I find it difficult why a country will make the self-proclaimed killers its country-representatives and how that appointments are “rejection” given the fact that—
- Ziaur Rahman dissolved the investigation commission for jail killing case on November 9, 1975;
- During Ziaur Rahman’s incumbency in 1979, The Indemnity Ordinance 1975 was ratified and made as Act by the Parliament to forbid the trial of the killings.
Even if we disregard the allegations by the self-proclaimed killers or by their lawyers who indicated that Ziaur Rahman silently supported their 15-August plan, the rejection theory really doesn’t make any sense.
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Akash,
“Near equivalence of various killings” would indeed be “appalling”, but that’s not at all what I argued. Instead, what I argued was that, for political pragmatism, it would have been good to have simultaneous “fast track” trials of other political murder cases which affect other political groups. Which would at least slightly blunt the anti-AL bloc’s dismissal of this verdict. It would give a signal of some level of parity in pursuing justice cases.
Now other bloggers made several points in rebuttal of my argument:
1. It is not in fact “fast track” since you have to start counting from the first AL govt’s arrival (a good point, however since the cases were virtually killed during the interim BNP govt, I count the new starting point as the 2009 arrival of new AL govt, and from that starting point, I still consider it “fast track” by BD standards)
2. That the anti-Al bloc will never consider any effort fair, even with addition of more cases (good point)
3. That the govt barely has enough resources to handle one case at a time (I did argue that govt can always find resources if they wish, however I do accept that this is generally true)
4. That the other major political killings were partially resolved, at least through speedy military trials in case of Zia killing, etc (as I pointed out, the main accused was mysteriously “killed by mob” and obviously how much justice is served in speedy, closed door trials is up for debate)
5. The one argument no one made, but that I would add now to this thread, is that 1971 war crimes trials will take huge resources, and that should be next priority.
None of the above argued that there was “equivalence” between various killings.
Of course the Mujib family murders were the watershed killings that accelerated Bangladesh’s downward spiral (derailing nascent democracy, already weakened by arrival of BKSAL; beginning the entry of military into politics; beginning the active Islamization of politics); were uniquely gruesome in their scale (the number of killed and the age of the youngest victim); particularly vicious in their scope (to wipe out an entire family, including those not involved in politics); and emotive in its register (a nation that kills it’s father becomes an orphan, plaything for all). Having said all of that, the killings of other political individuals should also be investigated.
You ascribe to me things I did not say or mean.
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1. Rumi bhai isn’t the author of this post. Look carefully, it’s by Tacit.
2. Raihan, you should read M R Akther Mukul’s Mujiburer Rakta Lal. Among other things, the book tells us that in mid-1975, Zia visited Bangabhaban and warned Mujib of various shenanigans going on in the cantonment, and urged the president to take appropriate actions. Mujib listened, laughed, said “don’t worry, ora amar chhele, even Ayub-Yahya couldn’t kill me’. Then Zia was invited to lunch with the president.
Mukul, in case you are not aware, was firmly in the so-called shadhinotar pokkho. This book, published when Zia was alive, accuses him of betraying 71-er chetona. Therefore, the question of Mukul trying to glorify Zia doesn’t arise.
3. Akash, Zia was a sidelined, powerless officer with no troops or command in mid-1975. He was waiting for clearance by an east European country to be sent as an ambassador. He is certainly guilty of not driving his car to Dhanmondi and get killed. But short of that, hard to see what else he could have done?
4. What Zia, and all non-AL governments since him, can be held accountable for is their inaction regarding bringing the killers to justice. Zia was ruthless against every threat from the left. Why the leniency against Faruq-Rashid, even though they also tried to kill him (Bogra insurgency in 1976)? Zia’s apologist will say ‘he didn’t want a 2-front war’. Maybe. What about Ershad? What about Khaleda? What about Moeen?
Here is an uncomfortable fact for the so-called jatiyatabadi hard-liners. What do Khaleda and Ershad have in common? They both used ‘Freedom Party’ as ‘opposition’ in their one-party elections. Ershad won a landslide against Faruq Rahman in 1986, and 10 years later BNP won a landslide against Freedom Party.
4. Syeed, I disagree with Tacit’s rejection theory. However, if you accept the decision of not pursuing the case (for whatever reason), having these men under watch, but safely outside the country in some obscure place like Australia, makes good sense. It’s a common practice in Latin America that ousted coupmakers are sent in diplomatic missions. And it is one being practised by the current government — in case you didn’t know, Bangladesh is represented in Australia by one Lt Gen Masud Uddin Chowdhury, GOC of 9 Infantry on 11 Jan 2007.
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Syeed Reply:
November 21st, 2009 at 5:21 am
Jyoti,
That is why I used other references to clear my stance. When diplomatic appointments can be both ‘rejection’ and ‘award’, one needs to look at the other facts (in this case, dismissal of Jail killing commission and legalizing indemnity act) to determine what this really was.
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Akash Reply:
November 22nd, 2009 at 4:54 am
You are being too gentle with Zia, making him a nice, little effeminate character. He could have, after discovering that young officers are up to something calamitous, stopped them in their tracks. But being the clever and ambitious strategist he was, he just watched and let things roll, that is, allowed the blood bath to begin, and jumped in to the fray in the most opportune moment. And don’t forget he was most proactive in establishing the indemnity rule, rewarding the killers with official diplomatic posts (even if one or two of them apparently went against him… it was then basically a tussle between upstart army officers behaving like tinpot South American generals). And not to forget Zia’s greatest contribution: reverse the spirit of all the aspects of the liberation war.
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These individuals had just killed the President of Bangladesh and effectively destroyed the existing political regime. They tried running Bangladesh for two months. They lost control of the army, and never managed to impress the populace. Had the stayed in Bangladesh, they could have tried to be in the vanguard of Bangladeshi nationalism, or whatever twisted version of that ideology they would have formulated, instead of Ziaur Rahman. This trial would have looked very different if one of the men sentenced to death were BNP or Jamaat leaders.
I have no answers for the passage of the Indemnity Ordinance. It was a mistake. However, Faruq would obviously claim that he had the support of the new power dispensation in Bangladesh. Doing otherwise would have drastically reduced his social cache.
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zafa noor Reply:
November 21st, 2009 at 9:57 am
Farook did not claim that he had the support of the new power dispensation in Bangladesh. In fact in his interview to Sunday Times that came out in May 1976, he lamented how Zia would not even meet him for a talk and dismissed him from army.
Here is excerpt from the May 1976 interview of Farook as it appeared in the paper.
***************************************************************************
In this remarkable article, the man who engineered the killing of the “father” of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, in August last year, challenges the present regime to put him on trial for murder. The man, Lieutenant Colonel Farook Rahman, accuses the present regime, led by General Ziaur (Zia) Rahman of betraying a movement that considered reform so vital that it killed the state’s founding father in an effort to achieve it. The article inevitably gives only one view of the crisis but it is crucial to understanding events in that tortured country.
“Let the Bangladesh government put me on trial for the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. I say it was an act of national liberation. Let them publicly call it a crime.
I engineered the coup of August 15 last year to put the brakes on my country’s headlong descent into hell.
……….. …………… …………… ……………
Since I had no ambition for personal power, I agreed last August to a suggestion by my colleague, and brother-in-law, Colonel Abdur Rashid, that Khandakar Mushtaque Ahmed, a senior politician, be made president to replace Mujib. He was given the task of national reconstruction. At the same time I personally insisted that Major General Zia be appointed chief of staff of the army. I thought he could unite and build up the force which had not only been humiliated by Sheikh Mujib but also had suffered terrible neglect at his hands.
In accepting the jobs we offered them, Mr Mushtaque and General Zia endorsed our reasons for the change. But they failed to follow through.
……….. …………… …………… ……………
As we have been accused of inciting indiscipline in the armed forces, let me set the record straight.
Colonel Rashid and I left the country last November and remained out of touch, but since then there have been at least four major incidents of men refusing to obey their officers’ orders. The first was in Dacca, second in Chittagong on February 28. The third a few days later in Bramanbaria and the fourth in Dacca – all before Rashid and I returned last month on a brief visit to discuss our future.
I went to Borga (north of Dacca) on April 29 to meet my troops at General Zia’s request. Next day Col Rashid was arrested and sent out of Bangladesh. I returned to Dacca on May 9 against the wishes of my troops, who suspected a similar trick would be played on me. I had been assured by senior officers that General Zia only wanted to talk to me, and that I would be allowed to return. In the event these assurances were worthless, Zia did not talk to me, but had me expelled plain.
Some newspapers have suggested I was plotting a coup to remove Zia. I refute this utterly. I could have killed him in his office as I has a revolver in my pocket for self-defence, but I had no intention of killing him. I only wanted to give him another chance to redeem his word before the troops.
……….. …………… …………… ……………
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Syeed Reply:
November 21st, 2009 at 11:09 am
Zafa,
You are probably confusing the timeline. Here it is–
March, 1975: Col Farooqur had a meeting with Ziaur Rahman and told him the plan. Zia’s reply was “I am a senior officer. I cannot be involved in such things. If you junior officers want to do it, go ahead” [Interview by Anthony Mascarenhas on ITV].
August, 1975: Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his family members were killed. Major General Ziaur Rahman was appointed as the army chief.
April 1976: Ziaur Rahman refused to talk to Col Farooq.
May 1976: According to your post, Farooq accused Ziaur Rahman of betrayal.
I am not taking a stance or saying that I believe all these. I am just quoting the self-proclaimed masterminds of this killing.
[Reply]
No. I am not confused about the time line.
I responded to the last lines of your earlier comment,
“However, Faruq would obviously claim that he had the support of the new power dispensation in Bangladesh. Doing otherwise would have drastically reduced his social cache.”
My point is that Farook was kept at bay by the “new power”, i.e., Zia’s admin. Of course the entire group of killers had Zia’s support, as evidenced from Zia’s actions, but Zia did not want them to stay in Bangladesh and involve in politics.
Rashid launched his “Freedom party” during Ershad’s regime.
The excerpt in my comment is from an article that quoted Farook’s own words, verbatim. The actual copy of the paper exists in the Library of Congress. Those were from Farook’s statement, not “according to me”. Nobody from Zia’s inner circle ever disputed Farook’s claim. Not then. Not now.
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Syeed Reply:
November 21st, 2009 at 12:01 pm
Zafa,
Seems we are on the same page… sorry for the confusion =)
My initial focus was the claim by the convicts that Zia was supporting them before the killing. But Jyoti’s reply on “new power dispensation” doesn’t deny Zia’s pre-coup support for it.
Since your post (I know the source, but thought its easy to refer it that way since there are number of posts here) didn’t have a year on it and hence it appeared that Farooq did not get support from Zia before. Hence the timeline. Anyway, all is cool.
[Reply]
zafa noor Reply:
November 21st, 2009 at 12:09 pm
No problem Syed.
BTW, my first response was addressed to the author Tacit’s comment. And second one was to yours.
[Reply]
Where does the fact that he went to see Sheikh Mujib to warn him about rumblings in the army fit into that timeline?
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Syeed Reply:
November 21st, 2009 at 6:28 pm
Tacit,
very good point. Like everyone, I also want to know when Zia talked to Mujib and what he talked about. That will explain a lot.
Here are some possible assumptions (assuming Col Farook is telling the truth about his pre-coup meeting with Zia)–
a. Zia met Mujib before March 1975 and talked about the general unrest in the military. This would mean that Mujib took it with all other similar non-specific threats which were given by national and international agencies. OR
b. Zia met Mujib after March 1975 and talked about the specific plot that he learned from Col Farooq. If this is the case, then Mujib needed to be more careful or shouldn’t have trusted the “chatukars”. This hypothesis will also put Zia in a very respectable position in the history. OR
c. Zia met Mujib after March 1975, but talked about only non-specific unrest in the army (something everyone was telling him). If this is the case, then Zia must have seen the future opportunity of Col Farooq’s plot. However, knowing how careful person he was, it is expected that he talked to Mujib without revealing the real plot so that he can later say “I told you so” should the coup fail!
In any case, I don’t think he was the mastermind of the plot. He just came to power as a consequence of it. If you read the stories behind his joining the liberation war; 27 March proclamation; 7 November coup… you will know how is always in the right place at the right time!
But I really don’t know which one of the above options is true. Can you share some references that talks about Zia’s visit? Would love to know.
[Reply]
This piece by Matiur Rahman may have been missed
http://www.prothom-alo.com/detail/date/2009-11-21/news/20383 For the record, pasting the piece here as well since it has some specific information.
বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা আন্দোলনের প্রতীক বঙ্গবন্ধু শেখ মুজিবুর রহমানকে সপরিবারে নৃশংস হত্যাকাণ্ডের বিচার হয়নি দীর্ঘদিন। আর এ দীর্ঘ বছরগুলোতে জিয়াউর রহমানের সামরিক ও বিএনপি সরকার, এরশাদের সামরিক ও জাতীয় পার্টি সরকার এবং বেগম খালেদা জিয়ার দুই আমলের বিএনপি সরকার বাংলাদেশের ইতিহাসের এ কলঙ্কজনক হত্যাকাণ্ডের বিচার হতে দেয়নি; বরং এ সরকারগুলো বঙ্গবন্ধুর হত্যাকারীদের বহুভাবে সহযোগিতা করেছে।
জিয়াউর রহমান রাষ্ট্রপতি থাকা অবস্থায় হত্যাকারীদের বিদেশে বাংলাদেশের দূতাবাসগুলোতে চাকরি এবং তাঁদের পদোন্নতির ব্যবস্থা করেছিলেন। বিভিন্ন ষড়যন্ত্রমূলক কর্মকাণ্ড এবং দেশের ভেতরে অভ্যুত্থানের চেষ্টার সঙ্গে তাঁদের সম্পৃক্ততার প্রমাণ পাওয়া গেলেও কোনো ব্যবস্থা নেওয়া হয়নি। এরশাদ সরকারের আমলেও দূতাবাসগুলোতে খুনিদের পদোন্নতি ও সহযোগিতার ধারা অব্যাহত থেকেছে। শুধু তা-ই নয়, এরশাদ সরকারের সহায়তায় তাঁরা দেশে ফিরে এসে একাধিক রাজনৈতিক দল (প্রগতিশীল গণতান্ত্রিক শক্তি ও ফ্রিডম পার্টি) গঠনের সুযোগ পেয়েছেন। তাঁদের সংসদে বসারও সুযোগ করে দেওয়া হয়েছিল। খালেদা জিয়ার সরকারও তাঁদের সহযোগিতা করেছিল।
দূতাবাসে চাকরি প্রদান
আমাদের কাছে তথ্য রয়েছে যে, ১৯৭৬ সালের ৮ জুন ১৫ আগস্ট হত্যাকাণ্ডের সঙ্গে যুক্ত থাকার দায়ে অভিযুক্ত হত্যাকারী গোষ্ঠীর ১২ জনকে বিভিন্ন দূতাবাসে চাকরি দেওয়া হয়েছিল।
১. লে. কর্নেল শরিফুল হককে (ডালিম) চীনে প্রথম সচিব, ২. লে. কর্নেল আজিজ পাশাকে আর্জেন্টিনায় প্রথম সচিব, ৩. মেজর এ কে এম মহিউদ্দিন আহমেদকে আলজেরিয়ায় প্রথম সচিব, ৪. মেজর বজলুল হুদাকে পাকিস্তানে দ্বিতীয় সচিব, ৫. মেজর শাহরিয়ার রশিদকে ইন্দোনেশিয়ায় দ্বিতীয় সচিব, ৬. মেজর রাশেদ চৌধুরীকে সৌদি আরবে দ্বিতীয় সচিব, ৭. মেজর নূর চৌধুরীকে ইরানে দ্বিতীয় সচিব, ৮. মেজর শরিফুল হোসেনকে কুয়েতে দ্বিতীয় সচিব, ৯. কর্নেল কিসমত হাশেমকে আবুধাবিতে তৃতীয় সচিব, ১০. লে. খায়রুজ্জামানকে মিসরে তৃতীয় সচিব, ১১. লে. নাজমুল হোসেনকে কানাডায় তৃতীয় সচিব, ১২. লে. আবদুল মাজেদকে সেনেগালে তৃতীয় সচিব হিসেবে নিয়োগ দেওয়া হয়েছিল। তাঁদের নিয়োগপত্র ঢাকা থেকে লিবিয়ায় পৌঁছে দিয়েছিলেন পররাষ্ট্র মন্ত্রণালয়ের তত্কালীন কর্মকর্তা ও পরবর্তীকালে পররাষ্ট্রসচিব শমসের মবিন চৌধুরী। এর আগে ওই বছরের ফেব্রুয়ারি-মার্চ মাসে তাঁদের সঙ্গে আলোচনা-সমঝোতার জন্য ঢাকা থেকে তত্কালীন ব্রিগেডিয়ার জেনারেল নুরুল ইসলাম (শিশু) ঢাকা থেকে লিবিয়া গিয়েছিলেন। ১৯৮০ সালের সেপ্টেম্বর মাসে জিয়াউর রহমানের নির্দেশে খুনিদের বাংলাদেশ সিভিল সার্ভিসে (ফরেন সার্ভিস ক্যাডার) অন্তর্ভুক্ত করে নেওয়া হয়। সে সময়ে পররাষ্ট্র মন্ত্রণালয়ের সূত্রে এসব জানা গিয়েছিল।
তবে ১২ জন সেনা কর্মকর্তা চাকরিতে যোগ দিতে রাজি হলেও ১৫ আগস্ট হত্যাকাণ্ডের প্রধান দুই হোতা কর্নেল সৈয়দ ফারুক রহমান ও কর্নেল খন্দকার আব্দুর রশীদ সরকারের সঙ্গে সমঝোতা ও চাকরি গ্রহণে অসম্মতি জানিয়েছিলেন। তাঁরা ব্যবসা-বাণিজ্যে লিবিয়ায় প্রেসিডেন্ট কর্নেল গাদ্দাফির সব ধরনের সহযোগিতা পান।
এরশাদ সরকারের আমলেও খুনিরা প্রত্যেকেই আরও বিভিন্ন দেশে গিয়েছেন, পদোন্নতিও পেয়েছেন। পররাষ্ট্র মন্ত্রণালয় সূত্রে আরও জানা যায়, মেজর ডালিমকে বেইজিং থেকে হংকংয়ে চার্জ দ্য অ্যাফেয়ার্স পদে নিয়োগ দেওয়া হয়। পরবর্তী সময়ে তাঁকে পোল্যান্ডের চার্জ দ্য অ্যাফেয়ার্স নিয়োগ দেওয়া হলে পোল্যান্ড সরকার তাঁকে গ্রহণ করতে অস্বীকৃতি জানিয়েছিল। পরে তাঁকে কেনিয়ায় হাইকমিশনার হিসেবে নিয়োগ দেওয়া হয়েছিল। মেজর নূর তখন ব্রাজিলে চার্জ দ্য অ্যাফেয়ার্স হিসেবে দায়িত্ব পালন করেছিলেন। এর আগে তিনি আলজেরিয়ায় কাউন্সিলর হিসেবে নিয়োগ পেয়েছিলেন। মেজর রাশেদ চৌধুরী টোকিওতে কাউন্সিলর পদে নিযুক্ত ছিলেন। মেজর এ কে এম মহিউদ্দিন সৌদি আরবের মিশন উপপ্রধান হিসেবে (বেনজির ভুট্টোর সরকারও করাচিতে একই পদে তাঁর নিয়োগ গ্রহণ করেনি), মেজর শরিফুল হোসেন ওমানে চার্জ দ্য অ্যাফেয়ার্স এবং লেফটেন্যান্ট খায়রুজ্জামান সে সময় ঢাকায় পররাষ্ট্র মন্ত্রণালয়ের পরিচালক পদে ছিলেন। উল্লেখ্য, শেষোক্ত জন ছাড়া বাকি সবাই পররাষ্ট্র মন্ত্রণালয়ে মিনিস্টার হিসেবে পদোন্নতি পেয়েছিলেন। তা ছাড়া লে. নাজমুল হোসেন ও ক্যাপ্টেন কিসমত হাশেম চাকরি ছেড়ে চলে যান। পরে তাঁরা কানাডার নাগরিকত্ব নেন বলে জানা যায়। লে. আবদুল মাজেদ বিদেশ থেকে ঢাকায় এসে একবার কারাগারে আটক ছিলেন। এ সম্পর্কে পরে আর কিছু জানা যায়নি।
হত্যাকারীদের অভ্যুত্থানের চেষ্টা
সত্তরের দশকের শেষে রাষ্ট্রপতি জিয়ার শাসনামলে আমরা এ তথ্য জেনেছিলাম যে, বিদেশে অবস্থানরত খুনি গোষ্ঠীর শরিফুল হক (ডালিম), আজিজ পাশা, বজলুল হুদা এবং নূর চৌধুরীসহ এই অভিযুক্তরা ১৯৮০ সালের ১৭ জুন ঢাকা সেনানিবাসে একটি অভ্যুত্থানের চেষ্টা করেছিলেন। সেনাবাহিনী অগ্রিম খবর পেয়ে তা ব্যর্থ করে দেয়। ঢাকায় অভ্যুত্থান-প্রয়াসীদের গ্রেপ্তার করে সামরিক আইনে বিচারের ব্যবস্থা করা হয়েছিল। ঢাকার রাজনৈতিক সূত্রগুলোর মাধ্যমে এসব খবর আমরা জেনেছিলাম।
সেনাবাহিনীর অনুসন্ধানে শরিফুল হক (ডালিম), আজিজ পাশা, বজলুল হুদা ও নূর চৌধুরীর সম্পৃক্ততার প্রমাণ মিলেছিল। তাঁদের সঙ্গে ফারুক ও রশিদের সরাসরি যুক্ত থাকার তথ্যও পেয়েছিল কর্তৃপক্ষ। তাঁরা উগ্র বামপন্থীদের সঙ্গে মিলে এ অভ্যুত্থান করতে চেয়েছিলেন। ১৯৭৯ সালের মে মাসে ইসলামাবাদ, পরে তেহরান ও আঙ্কারায় বিভিন্ন সময়ে বৈঠক করে ষড়যন্ত্রের পরিকল্পনা করেছিলেন। এ সময় তাঁরা একাধিকবার ঢাকায় বৈঠক করেন। সর্বশেষ ১৯৮০ সালের মে মাসে ঢাকায় চূড়ান্ত সভা হয়েছিল; তাতে ডালিম, পাশা ও হুদা উপস্থিত ছিলেন। তাঁদের সঙ্গে যোগ দিয়েছিলেন জেল থেকে সদ্য মুক্তিপ্রাপ্ত কর্নেল ফারুক রহমান। এখানে উল্লেখ্য যে, ১৯৭৭ সালের কোনো একসময়ে ফারুক গোপনে ঢাকায় এসে অবস্থানকালে গ্রেপ্তার হয়ে কারাগারে আটক ছিলেন। তাঁদের লক্ষ্য ছিল অভ্যুত্থানের মাধ্যমে জিয়াউর রহমান ও এরশাদকে হত্যা করে দেশে ‘ইসলামি সমাজতন্ত্র’ প্রতিষ্ঠা করা। এসব তথ্য আরও বিস্তারিত জানা যায় ব্রিগেডিয়ার (অব.) সাখাওয়াত হোসেনের বাংলাদেশ: রক্তাক্ত অধ্যায় গ্রন্থ থেকে। ব্রিগেডিয়ার সাখাওয়াত হোসেনকে (বর্তমানে নির্বাচন কমিশনার) বিদ্রোহ-পরবর্তী সেনাসদস্যদের বিচারের জন্য সেনাবাহিনী থেকে সরকারি কৌঁসুলি হিসেবে নিয়োগ দেওয়া হয়েছিল।
অভ্যুত্থান ব্যর্থ হয়ে গেলে ডালিম, হুদা ও নূর বিদেশে নিজ নিজ কর্মস্থল ত্যাগ করে বিভিন্ন দেশে পালিয়ে যান। আজিজ পাশা তখন ঢাকায় থাকায় গ্রেপ্তার হন। তিনি রাজসাক্ষী হতে রাজি হন এবং পরে তাঁকে চাকরিতে পুনর্বহাল করে সরকার কূটনীতিকের দায়িত্ব দিয়ে রোমে পাঠায়। পরবর্তী সময়ে তাঁকে ঢাকায় পররাষ্ট্র ও অর্থ মন্ত্রণালয়ে দায়িত্ব দেওয়া হয়েছিল বলে জানা যায়। পরে ডালিম, হুদা ও নূরকেও বিভিন্ন দেশে আবার কূটনীতিকের দায়িত্বে পুনর্বহাল করা হয় এবং তাঁরা একাধিক পদোন্নতি পান।
শুধু অভ্যুত্থান-প্রচেষ্টা নয়, খুনিচক্রের বিরুদ্ধে এমন অভিযোগও ছিল যে বিদেশে বাংলাদেশ দূতাবাসের দায়িত্ব পালনকালে তাঁরা বহু অনিয়ম, শৃঙ্খলা ভঙ্গ ও অর্থ অপচয় করেছেন। শেষ পর্যন্ত ১৯৯৬ সালে আওয়ামী লীগ সরকার ক্ষমতায় আসার পর শরিফুল হক (ডালিম), আজিজ পাশা, এ কে এম মহিউদ্দিন আহমেদ, রাশেদ চৌধুরী ও নূর চৌধুরী—এই ছয় অভিযুক্তকে সরকারি চাকরিবিধি লঙ্ঘনের অভিযোগে চাকরিচ্যুত করা হয়।
রাজনীতিতে অংশগ্রহণ
শাহরিয়ার রশিদ ও বজলুল হুদার ’৮০ সালের ১৭ জুন অভ্যুত্থান-প্রচেষ্টায় জড়িত থাকার প্রমাণ পাওয়ার পরও তাঁদের বিরুদ্ধে কোনো ব্যবস্থা না নিয়ে এরশাদ সরকারের আমলে ঢাকায় আসতে দেওয়া হয়। তাঁরা ঢাকায় প্রগতিশীল গণতান্ত্রিক শক্তি (প্রগশ) নামের একটি রাজনৈতিক দল গঠন করেন। তখনই এ কথা জানা গিয়েছিল যে, এরশাদ সরকার ও গোয়েন্দা সংস্থার সহায়তায় তাঁরা এ উদ্যোগ নিয়েছিলেন। পরে বজলুল হুদা ফ্রিডম পার্টিতে যোগ দেন। এর পরপরই আমরা দেখি, ১৯৮৫ সালে লে. কর্নেল ফারুক ও লে. কর্নেল রশিদ ‘১৫ আগস্ট বিপ্লবের আদর্শ বাস্তবায়ন’ সংগঠনের নামে ঢাকায় এসে রাজনৈতিক কর্মকাণ্ড শুরু করেন। ১৯৮৬ সালের রাষ্ট্রপতি নির্বাচনে লে. কর্নেল ফারুক প্রার্থী হন। ১৯৮৭ সালের ৩ আগস্ট হোটেল শেরাটনে সংবাদ সম্মেলন করে কর্নেল ফারুক রহমানকে সভাপতি করে ফ্রিডম পার্টি প্রতিষ্ঠার ঘোষণা দিয়েছিলেন কর্নেল রশিদ। ফ্রিডম পার্টির প্রার্থী হিসেবে বজলুল হুদাকে ’৮৮ সালের সংসদ নির্বাচনে মেহেরপুর-২ আসন থেকে সাংসদ নির্বাচিত করা হয়। অবশ্য এর আগে ১৯৮৩ সালের ১৬ ডিসেম্বর কর্নেল রশিদ ও কর্নেল ফারুক মুক্তির পথ নামে একটি বই প্রকাশ করেছিলেন।
এটা তখনই বোঝা গিয়েছিল, স্বৈরাচারী এরশাদ গণতান্ত্রিক শক্তিগুলোর বিরুদ্ধে ব্যবহার করতে একটি সন্ত্রাসী রাজনৈতিক দল হিসেবে ফ্রিডম পার্টিকে গড়ে তুলতে চেয়েছিলেন। ফ্রিডম পার্টি গঠনের পরপরই ৭ নভেম্বর লে. কর্নেল রশিদের নির্দেশে ঢাকায় প্রেসক্লাব চত্বরে একটি সভাকে কেন্দ্র করে ফ্রিডম পার্টির ক্যাডাররা পাজেরো থেকে প্রকাশ্যে গোলাগুলি করলে এক কিশোরের মৃত্যু হয়েছিল। পরের বছর ১১ ফেব্রুয়ারি ময়মনসিংহে একইভাবে বজলুল হুদা ও তাঁর ক্যাডার বাহিনীর গুলিতে একজন ব্যবসায়ী মারা যান। সে সময়ের দৈনিক সংবাদপত্রের মাধ্যমে এসব খবর জানা গিয়েছিল।
এরপর আমরা দেখি, লে. কর্নেল রশিদকে ১৯৯৬ সালের ১৫ ফেব্রুয়ারির ভোটারবিহীন নির্বাচনে ফ্রিডম পার্টির প্রার্থী হিসেবে কুমিল্লা-৬ আসন থেকে সাংসদ নির্বাচিত করা হয়। বিরোধী দলের নেতাও করা হয়েছিল তাঁকে।
বিভিন্ন সূত্রে তখনই আরও জানা গিয়েছিল, ফারুক-রশিদ লিবিয়ায় থাকা অবস্থায় ফ্রিডম পার্টির কর্মীদের লিবিয়া সরকারের সহায়তায় সশস্ত্র প্রশিক্ষণের ব্যবস্থা করা হয়েছিল। আরও জানা যায়, লিবিয়ায় প্রায় এক হাজার যুবককে তিন থেকে ছয়, এমনকি নয় মাস পর্যন্ত সশস্ত্র প্রশিক্ষণের ব্যবস্থা করা হয়েছিল। লিবিয়ায় পিস্তল থেকে শুরু করে মেশিনগানসহ আধুনিক অস্ত্রের প্রশিক্ষণ নেওয়া ক্যাডাররাই ছিল ফ্রিডম পার্টির প্রধান ভিত্তি। তবে এ ব্যাপারে কোনো সরকারের আমলে কোনো তদন্ত হয়েছিল বলে জানা যায় না।
খুনিচক্রের এসব কর্মকাণ্ড থেকে দেখা যায়, রাষ্ট্রপতি জিয়া, স্বৈরাচারী এরশাদ ও বেগম খালেদা জিয়া সরকারের সময় দেশে-বিদেশে চাকরি, ব্যবসা-বাণিজ্য, সংসদ সদস্য হওয়া এবং সন্ত্রাসী কর্মকাণ্ডসহ সব কার্যক্রমের প্রকাশ্য সুযোগ-সুবিধা পেয়েছিলেন বঙ্গবন্ধুর খুনিচক্র।
১৯৭৫-পরবর্তী প্রায় তিন দশকের নানা ঘটনায় দেখা যায়, বঙ্গবন্ধুর খুনিরা দেশে-বিদেশে যেখানেই থেকেছেন, সেখানে বসেই বাংলাদেশের গণতন্ত্রের বিরুদ্ধে ষড়যন্ত্র করেছেন। কখনো কোনো একটি রাজনৈতিক দলের ব্যানারে, কখনো বা সামরিক বাহিনী বা সরকারের অভ্যন্তরে শক্তিগুলোর সহায়তা নিয়ে এ গোষ্ঠী ষড়যন্ত্র চালিয়ে গেছে অব্যাহতভাবে।
[Reply]
Syeed/Tacit, according to Mukul’s book, Zia had at least one meeting with Mujib a few weeks before 15 August. Mukul doesn’t say whether they talked about anything specific or not. And even if they did talk about anything specific, there is no reason to believe the specifics would have been about Faruq’s plot. In fact, in July 1975, Faruq would have been a relative nobody among the conspiracy rumour mongerers — ‘real action’ would have been with Taher/Ziauddin JSD people. Taher’s final statement, as described in Unfinished Revolution, is full of fire and brimstone rhetoric against Mujib’s ‘misrule’ and how he was planning to have district level ‘justice’ against Bakshalis etc. Who’s to say Zia didn’t warn Mujib about any of that stuff, believing Faruq’s plot to be just bravado?
As for ‘joining the liberation war; 27 March proclamation; 7 November coup… you will know how is always in the right place at the right time!’ — if you actually read the history closely, you’ll know that there is a fundamental difference between 27 March and 7 Nov. On 27 March, any other Bengali major could have issued a proclamation. The relevance there was that a serving major in the Pakistan army made the proclamation. And Zia could have simply walked away from the war — many other Bengali officers did. On 7 Nov, there was no one else in Bangladesh with a higher stature.
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Anyway, we have had 16 comments about Zia in a post reflecting on 15 August. Since none of us were there when Zia talked with Faruq or Mujib, this discussion could go on forever without any particularly novel insight. If Tacit hadn’t mentioned Zia, the post would still have raised some very strong points. Let me repeat something I wrote in Rumi bhai’s on one of these points (and potentially make everyone uncomfortable).
Tacit said “there was only one side in 15th August 1975 that took action.”
Many people (including myself) believe the government did the best they could during the Pilkhana tragedy. Sure there were specific things that could have been done better. But on the big picture issue of ‘to send in the troops’, many of us (though perhaps not the writer of this post) agree with the government’s stance.
Here is a question then to those who share my view on Pilkhana — why doesn’t the same logic apply to 15 August?
Imagine yourself to be Shafiullah, Zia, Khaled, Khalil, or any other senior officer. Early morning you hear tanks are at Dhanmondi and the president is under attack. At that time, you have no way of knowing the gruesome full extent of the massacre (just like in Pilkhana according to the dominant narrative). You are reasonably sure that by the time you send troops from Savar or Kurmitola, president will be dead and there will be a gun battle in Mirpur Rd (how was anyone to know that the tanks had no shell)? Why not wait for directives from the politicians? When Zia was informed, he said ‘If the president is dead, there is vice president. Uphold the constitution.’ (Source: Col Shafat Jamil — ally of Khaled Mosharraf and a fierce critic of Zia). Why was this not the right reaction?
You can criticise Shafiullah for being a coward who took orders from junior officers. But there is another way to think about it. None of the top brass was interested in running the country. When Khondoker Mushtaq (who was not the vice president) formed a government with the full support of most of Bakshal, what was the right course of action? Overthrow this government in a countercoup? Or allow politics to play out? If you were going to overthrow the government, how would you do it? Khaled Mosharraf (number 3 in the brass) wanted to overthrow the government, Zia (number 2) didn’t want to lead anything, and Khalilur Rahman (the newly installed number 1) was silent. When Khaled Mosharraf moved, was that the right course of action?
After Pilkhana, many of us applauded the fact that despite tremendous pressure, our army waited for the order, and didn’t fire a shot because the order never came. Why doesn’t the same logic apply to each and every uniformed men who did nothing on 15 Aug and after?
I believe that right or wrong, the responsibility for Pilkhana lies solely on the civilian government. Why doesn’t the same logic apply on 15 Aug? Why do we have 16 comments on Zia, and not any for the gross failure of the civilian leadership?
And those of you who wanted a military solution in February 2009, would you have wanted one in August 1975? Those of you who are old enough, be honest with your answer. And if you were ready to risk Dhanmondi in a gun battle in August 1975 after the president was dead, why would you answer any differently in Feb 2009?
[Reply]
Syeed Reply:
November 22nd, 2009 at 6:25 am
Jyoti,
So the known account of the history tells that Zia met Mujib after his meeting with Col Farooq, but did not mention Col Farooq’s specific plot, right?
Now, if Zia actually asked Col Farook to “go ahead”, then there is no need to discuss any further why Zia did not reveal Farook’s plot.
But, if Zia really didn’t want the coup to happen (there is a difference between not getting involved as a Senior Officer and not wanting the coup to happen), then the “real action vs unknown bravado” theory is quite perplexing.
You are saying that Zia did not warn Mujib about Farook’s plot believing it was bravado from an unknown person?
It’s hard to believe that Zia (even being the ‘Hilal-i-Jurat’, ‘Bir Uttom’, and Sector Commander of liberation war) didn’t know the significance of knowing a specific plot in relation to other general conspiracy theories. Who’s to argue (knowing his bright military training) that he didn’t know that at the end, it’s always the unknown assassin who strike!
Why 16 posts on this?
No one is saying that Zia was the mastermind… not even AL argued that in the court… it’s just that the theme of the original post was on ‘what could have been done’. And when most of the military-civil leadership had hours to respond on August 15, a Major General had FIVE MONTHS to do something after knowing the specific plot… but he didn’t act.
[Reply]
tacit Reply:
November 22nd, 2009 at 11:08 am
“A Major General had five months to respond.” Is that really fair? Zia was the Deputy Chief of Staff, who had been superseded in favor of Shafiullah. He was not the chief of staff of any force, unlike Shafiullah or Khalilur Rahman or A. K. Khondokar, nor was he the commander of any army unit. If he went to see the President, then I assume the agenda of his meeting was not exactly secret. Moreover, at that time, wasn’t the Rakkhi Bahini the agency in charge of this?
I just get the feeling that the bar for Zia is being raised higher and higher. It’s not enough that he went and warned Sheikh Mujib. Now it’s if Zia didn’t give the President the date, time, place, and make of tank used to shell Dhanmondi, he was supporting the killers?
[Reply]
Syeed Reply:
November 22nd, 2009 at 3:12 pm
No, the bar is not being raised for Zia.
As said before, since I don’t know when and what exactly was told to Mujib by Zia, we can only have some hypothesis (which again depends on whether you buy Col Farook’s confession or not).
It could very well be the fact that Zia did not know Farook’s plot and his warning did not mean anything to Mujib (for the reasons you have aptly mentioned in the original post). This was my first hypothesis. In fact, the bar has always been lowered for Mujib who wrongly thought “bangali amarey marbe na”. Since he is the victim, people usually avoid talking about what he also could have done to stop this.
By ‘to do something’, I had no expectation from Zia other than revealing the plot, and that is IF he actually knew the plot as the convicts have suggested repeatedly.
IF he actually revealed that and Mujib didn’t do anything, then Zia definitely have served his duty (not as army person, but as a sensible human being). That would be my second hypothesis.
However, I believe it would be the duty of any human being to warn a potential victim of any such plot (if he knew it) irrespective of his rank and promotional grievance. That’s just my third hypothesis.
Offcourse, Zia’s aggressive pro-indemnity and pro-rajakar stance (e.g. amendments of related laws) during the post 15 August is often taken as proxy indicators in support of the third hypothesis. But I believe, it could very well be the fact that he didn’t know the plot and his support for indemnity and reversal or anti rajakar laws are unrelated to his rpe-15 August stance.
My last comment on what Zia could have done came in response to Jyoti’s reference to Zia’s post-March 1975 meeting with Mujib. The reference also guessed that Zia probably did not talk about the actual plot (for reasons given in that comments). If we do not trust what Col Farook or all other convicts and their lawyers have said, then there is no reason to blame Zia for any pre-coup actions.
So it all comes down to – whether Zia actually knew the plot or not (and there is no room for downplaying the significance of knowing and revealing a specific plot).
Jyoti bhai,
1) It is not true that there were no army action in Pilkhana. Army tanks were waiting outside the HQ. There was no action from Shafiullah.None.
2)BDR soldiers did not march towards Bangabhaban, parliament,BTV or Radio. They killed senior officers and took their families as hostage. This was not the case in 1975. They killed the President and his family and took control of power.
3)I agree that it was a gross failure of the civilian leadership. But most of those civilian leaders paid dearly for it. On the other hand, Zia benefited from the coup, helped Mujib killers to establish themselves, and made an alliance with anti-liberation forces. Later, he became the poster boy of anti-Mujib forces. That explains why there we have 16 comments about him but not any for the gross failure of the civilian leadership.
Ps.
I don’t think this is the right justice. The SC court should have asked the gov’t to kill all of them. SH should have taken vengeance by appointing assassins. SH should have followed Golda Mair’s Olympic revenge. Kill them all with their families.In dhaka. in Libya.in Canada….in america. Only then- we would have realized the difference between justice and vengeance.
[Reply]
jyoti Reply:
November 22nd, 2009 at 6:06 am
Raihan, except for Mushtaq himself, which politician paid dearly for their action those days? Mushtaq’s vice president was Muhammadullah, who became an MP under both Zia and Ershad. Another senior minister was Obaidur Rahman, who went on to be a senior BNP leader. His defence advisor was Osmani, who was AL nominee in the presidential election against Zia. Malek Ukil continued to be the Speaker of the House, and despite saying 15 Aug was ‘Firaun er poton’, became the AL leader until Hasina’s return. Justice Abu Syeed Chowdhury, Mushtaq’s foreign minister, had a very productive life in academia and international diplomacy. Tofail Ahmed, the de facto head of Rakkhi Bahini, was sidelined from AL not because of 1975, but because of his role after 1/11. So tell me, exactly which politician paid dearly?
The ones who didn’t join Mushtaq then paid dearly. And even if for arguments sake we assume that Zia was the evil genius and the ultimate beneficiary, he also eventually paid dearly —- live by the bullet, die by the bullet.
[Reply]
Syeed Reply:
November 22nd, 2009 at 6:37 am
Are you juxtaposing “who didn’t join Mushtaq then paid dearly” with “Zia also eventually paid dearly”?
[Reply]
jyoti Reply:
November 22nd, 2009 at 7:28 am
No. I am juxtaposing those who did join Mushtaq and paid nothing with Zia who also eventually paid dearly.
Syeed Reply:
November 22nd, 2009 at 8:20 am
Oh, you meant “who did join Mushtaq and paid nothing” while Zia also worked with Mushtaq but “eventually paid dearly”. Agree.
Jyoti Bhai poses a good hypothetical. Having argued vociferously for military intervention sooner (much sooner) at Pilkhana, I certainly think the onus for prompt military action was even more urgent on August 15th.
[Reply]
Syeed, AL didn’t pursue the court case. People’s Republic of Bangladesh did. The difference is non-trivial. AL accuses Zia of being the mastermind all the time — look up any sundry speech by an AL leader.
I am not saying anything about what Zia told Mujib — I wasn’t there, and haven’t read any first hand account. You are the one making all sorts of hypothesis, and I added to your list of hypotheses. And keep in mind, the source of the Farook-Zia meeting is Farook himself, who in addition to being a convicted killer of Mujib and family, also held enough grudge against Zia to plot further murder and mayhem. One can easily ask why we should believe anything Farook had said?
Now, think about the context in which Tacit mentioned Zia.
“Consultation and conspiracy regarding this started at least months ago. Apparently Indian intelligence warned Sheikh Mujib of the attack. So did at least one civilian intelligence agency. Then Deputy Army Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Ziaur Rahman visited the President and warned him regarding grumblings of unrest in the Army.
Who then, were the individuals who negated all these warnings? The individuals who said, “Mujib Bhai, nothing will happen?”
Of course, whom would President Sheikh Mujib trust, a superseded officer such as Ziaur Rahman, who was never a part of the AL inner circle? Or Khandkar Mushtaque Ahmed, the “shoshur baba” in the marriages of both Sheikh Jamal and Sheikh Kamal?”
While are making theories about what Zia may or may not have heard from Farook and may or may not have told Mujib, we are ignoring the much larger point. Again, to quote Tacit:
“Part of the reason Sheikh Shaheb never paid heed to any warnings about uprising because he blinded himself to the most egregious fault in our collective nature. We love to over-exult when the times are good. However, when the chips are down, and it is time for action: we are hesitant, doubtful, and faltering. Today, Dhaka is full of people claiming that they have borne a burden in their heart for 34 years. In addition to being a grievous insult to those who have actually borne a burden for 34 years, it is also a lie. It is easy for people to stand in Bangladesh in 2009, with a ten-month AL government with a nine-tenth majority in the Parliament and Sheikh Mujib’s daughter as Prime Minister and his close associate as President, and claim that this is the single greatest moment in their lives. It was, likewise, extremely easy to tell the President of Bangladesh, and the dictator of our state (not in the sense we understand it, but in the actual sense of the word), that there was no way that a couple of army punks would dare to against Sheikh Mujib. And boy, if they did, they would soon see “koto dhane koto chaal.””
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Tacit, let’s explore this further: the onus for prompt military action was even more urgent on August 15th.
Who should be held responsible? On Pilkhana, the responsibility is squarely with the PM (and I reiterate, I believe she did the right thing given information set). Where did the accountability rest on 15 Aug?
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Akash, I contend that the single most important ideal of the Liberation War was democracy. And Zia was neither the first nor the only leader to have departed from that ideal. We would all do well reflect on this fact.
[Reply]
tacit Reply:
November 22nd, 2009 at 12:37 pm
Well, Jyoti Bhai, as it’s already clear by the several errors in my write-up which you pointed out, my knowledge about Bangladesh in 1975 has several gaps. However, from what I understand, the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini was raised as a paramilitary which would have unquestioned loyalty to Sk. Mujib. It seems they would have some responsibility in the matter.
Then the entire army command: Shafiullah, Zia, 46th Brig Commander, they were all in dereliction of duty. I don’t know enough about the chain of command in 1975, but anyone who did not follow Col. Jamal Uddin’s example, and jump in a car and head towards Dhanmondi, was not doing his job.
And finally, the officer in charge of guarding the Presidential residence. Someone came and took all the ammo away without replenishing the stock? And that’s why the soldiers guarding the president cold not shoot back? That story just seems really, really fishy to me.
[Reply]
jyoti Reply:
November 22nd, 2009 at 1:14 pm
Don’t worry about not knowing too much about 1975. None of us do, it’s just that some are more aware of our ignorance than others.
Let’s take this a bit further.
We agree that Mushtaq’s government was illegitimate. He wasn’t the vice president (I believe it was Syed Nazrul Islam but could be wrong), speaker (Malek Ukil) or PM (Mansur Ali). Would a coup overthrowing Mushtaq and restoring the status quo ante (Bakshal) have been the right thing to do? If so, who would have been the right person to do this? Khalilur Rahman (Mushtaq appointed joint chief of staff — only time someone held that post in Bangladesh)? Zia, the newly promoted army chief? If Mushtaq’s government was illegitimate, then were these promotions legitimate? Or was it incumbent upon Khaled Mosharraf, the only one in the senior brass to not be promoted by Mushtaq?
Given Faruq’s tanks controlled Bangabhaban, how much violence would have been acceptable to oust Mushtaq? When Khaled did move, his ally Wing Commander Khademul Bashar sent MiG 21s to fly over the city. If Faruq-Rashid-Dalim didn’t agree to fly out, should the presidential palace have been bombed?
Or, was it better for the army to have left politics to the politicians, even after agreeing that 15 August a terrible tragedy?
You see, we can argue a lot about what Zia did or didn’t hear or tell. Other than point scoring, unless someone provides some new information, I don’t see any utility from that discussion. But these questions are still pertinent. I believe there is a non-trivial risk of a repeat of 1/11. If something like that did happen, what will be the right thing for the other generals to do?
[Reply]
Syeed Reply:
November 22nd, 2009 at 5:07 pm
Jyoti,
Offcourse “AL didn’t pursue the court case. People’s Republic of Bangladesh did”. But the case was only pursued during AL regimes, and we also know that the People’s Republic of Bangladesh did NOT pursue the case when BNP was in power. I won’t argue HOW AL could bring Zia issue in the court if it wanted (I assume you already know).
But, I agree that AL often associate Zia with the 15-August coup. When looked carefully, the allgatin is based mainly on “circumstantial evidence”. For instance—
a. Confession of the convicts (NOT limited to Col Farook’s interview and is supported by other convicts and their lawyers);
b. His role in protecting the killers by legal and official means;
c. The apparent similarity between the goal of the killers (i.e. to establish Islamic Republic) with that of Zia’s actions (i.e. pro-Islamic revision of constitution);
d. Zia’s immediate legal and administrative actions to stop the trial of major Collaborators (which btw had nothing to do with unifying the nation… that was done by Mujib through the conditional general amnesty) and his link with its beneficiaries.
All these are indirect and even if one can prove any or all the above, it will only make Zia the beneficiary and hence supporter of the coup, NOT the mastermind. Offcourse, circumstantial evidences were also brought against the convicted killers. But I think AL did not want the “People’s Republic of Bangladesh” to bring that issue in the court.
As for comments on Tacit’s post, my response is here (where I also acknowledge tacit’s point on “Mujib not heeding to any warnings about uprising”).
[Reply]
jyoti Reply:
November 22nd, 2009 at 5:25 pm
As every non-AL government since 1975 did pretty much all of what you say (except the ‘confessions’), and since some of these governments were actually popularly elected, your logic can lead to some absurd conclusions pretty quickly. You can do better my friend.
You can continue the circumstantial shadow boxing about Zia, I’m going to stick to those hypothetical questions about what exactly were the right things to do in 1975. That can actually assist us if we are unfortunate enough to face another 1/11 — a possibility that we are constantly being warned against.
[Reply]
Syeed Reply:
November 22nd, 2009 at 5:51 pm
Every non-AL government? hmm… let’s see…Mushtaq, Zia, Sattar, Ershad, K Zia… yeah, you are right
How come I became the “circumstantial shadow boxer”? I am not the one who is accusing Zia. YOU said AL leaders do, and I just listed some of them only to conclude that “those are indirect accusations by AL” and “doesn’t make Zia the mastermind” =)
Anyway, enough for Mujib-Zia for this month.
Sorry Syeed I am not yet “done”.
Jyoti,
In your attempt to highlight failure of the civilian leadership you drew parallel between BDR carnage and Aug 15 mass murder. That is a stretch. Both were horrible tragedies for our nation and both were orchestrated by military personnel. The similarities of the events end there.
When BDR massacre was taking place back in February this year, the head of state was tucked away in her office in Bongobhaban. She along with Sahara Khatun, Nanok et al had the chance to discuss the plan of actions. To their credit they did a marvelous job. But in ’75, the head of state himself was under attack, in the wee hour of the night, while the entire city slept.
The BDR massacre took place in broad day light, with camera crew outside the gates sending live feeds, and citizen’s journalism was in full swing with updates via internet and cell phones. There was very little transparency in late 70’s Dhaka. Propaganda machines were in full swing, conflicting news were circulating and confusing the grieving nation.
Also remember, the Aug 15 mayhem never took the shape of “hostage situation” as the BDR episode seemed to have at the beginning. The killers marched inside the residence of the president and gunned down one by one, not giving the rest of governing body a lot of opportunity to react. There were 20+ deadbodies, including that of a cabinet minister, before the break of dawn.
The governing body was infested by traitors and thugs, and joined hands with Moshtaque. The killers were harboring inside the bongobhaban for days following the carnage. In the days that followed, those who were loyal to Mujib and could potentially come after the killers, were thrown and locked away in jail and later killed.
When the subject is Mujib murder trial, and the how it has haunted the nation for over 3 decades, there is no way of avoiding Zia’s role in it, preceding the coup. What he did, rather did NOT do after the bloody coup was like a betrayal in the highest degree with the nation.
Zia’s actions were brutal and inhuman. He did not allow the surviving daughter to come to Bangladesh and visit the graves of their loved ones. He pretty much gagged the press during his residency. The text books did not reflect the contribution of Mujib during liberation war. Fear and intimidation worked like charm for Zia’s people. Explains why people who were in the ‘know’ could not do much to revolt.
[Reply]
Badal Reply:
November 23rd, 2009 at 12:03 am
This above comment is full of misinformations.
A. Zia had no failings in 15th August as Zia did not have any assigned responsibility. He was in a strange rank called Deputy Chief of Army Staff. This rank was unheard off before and this rank had no power or job to do. Theoretically he was suppoesed to be acting army chief when Army Chief Shafiullah leaves country or is unable to carry out duties. Zia had no one except his batman under his command.
B. History confirms that Zia was the only one in the country on the morning of 15th August who asked to follow the constitution and let the VP take over.
C. BDR massacre was not orchestrated by military personnel, rather it was orchestrated on military personnel. And the government’s inaction allowed the criminals nearly 48 hours to search and kill every remaining hiding officer in Pilkhana campus.
D. Zia never barred Sheikh Hasina from returning to Bangladesh. The fact is that Zia gave personal guarantee to Indian government about Hasina’s safety before Sheikh Hasina returned to Bangladesh during Zia’s rule.
E. Zia did not gag the press during his presidency. Rather the opposite happened. Mujib gagged the press during his presidency. He cancelled press freedom, shut down all non government owned newspapers and took over the ownership of Ittefaq and only allowed four state run newspapers. Zia step by step allowed complete press freedom, allowed private newspapers. If one reads newspeprs during Zia’s regime, one will see how openly critical the media was about Zia.
F. Whatever Zia did to undermine Mujib in textbook and history, successive Awami League governmnets did 100 times worse manipulation of history/ text books to undermine anyone but Mujib in our history.
[Reply]
zafa noor Reply:
November 23rd, 2009 at 12:35 am
A. Zia’s actions following the coup show that he aided and abetted the murderers.
B. Zia damaged the constitution with his effort to wipe out secularism and validating Indemnity Ordinance.
C. BDR’s jowans are not same as army soldiers, but they are administered by army officers and they are trained in the same boot camp as the army soldiers. Govt was not inactive. Govt did everything they could to negotiate and save lives, with the available info and resources at the time.
D. Hasina and her sister were informed that their lives would be in jeopardy if they tried to come to Bangladesh.
E. The popular war time songs like “shono ekti Mujiborer theke” and “Joy Bangla, Banglar joy”, and Mujib’s inspiring re war speech were banned from laying anywhere in Bangladesh.
F. So you agreed that Zia’s admin doctored liberation war information in history text books. Thank you.
[Reply]
tacit Reply:
November 23rd, 2009 at 1:24 am
Arguing about Zia’s actions after he assumed state power, and then contending that that proved he “aided” and “abetted” murderers, which are criminal charges, seems to be a tenuous argument at best. It is one thing to disagree with Zia’s policies for Bangladesh, it is another to claim that these policies meant that he aided and abetted Sk. Mujib’s killers.
Asif Reply:
November 23rd, 2009 at 10:08 am
Just one question to those who grew up in the era of Zia — how many times did you hear the name Mujib?
I think a simple point is this — those who appreciate the verdict also needs to accept (without trying to rationalize) the actions condoning the killers mentioned in this comment ( http://unheardvoice.net/blog/2009/11/19/a-verdict-in-november/comment-page-1/#comment-20324 ) in the post 75 era.
Jyoti mentions a institutional failure but the reality is that in the 4th year since the liberation, there was hardly any institution built and in place. This was also first such major assassination in the sub-continent. Since then Indira, her son, Bhutto and his daughter, have been killed off.
Comparison with Pilkhana does not hold at all. Pilkhana was under a central civilian command of the PM and the fight was between military and a quasi-military group. Whereas in 1975, the central civilian decision maker was killed off by junior ranking military officers whereas the senior leadership stood still.
jyoti Reply:
November 23rd, 2009 at 10:23 am
But Asif, that’s my point: Pilkhana was under a central civilian command of the PM and the fight was between military and a quasi-military group. Whereas in 1975, the central civilian decision maker was killed off by junior ranking military officers whereas the senior leadership stood still.
Because the central civilian decision maker was killed off, exactly where did the senior military responsibility begin? Tacit’s piece is about people who had larger responsibility. Who exactly are the ones most responsible. ‘They were all responsible’ isn’t really an answer, is it?
Btw, this wasn’t the first such major assassination in the sub-continent. Gandhiji, Liaquat Ali Khan and Bandarnaike of Sri Lanka were assassinated earlier. This was the first time junior officers staged a coup in the subcontinent. All of Pakistan’s coups, and the two post-Zia coups in Bangladesh, were carried out by the senior command.
—-
Agree that those of us who appreciate the verdict also have to accept, without trying to rationalise, the actions of post-75 governments condoning the killers. I don’t think anyone who appreciates the verdict has claimed anything to the contrary, whether here or elsewhere. I think I was pretty blunt about it in the point 4 here:
http://unheardvoice.net/blog/2009/11/19/a-verdict-in-november/comment-page-1/#comment-20307
Asif Reply:
November 23rd, 2009 at 11:14 am
I think Tacit’s original post had a passing remark which almost tried to rationalize these postings.
Regarding responsibilities: it lay with the senior leadership of the army to control the juniors. Just like the coup was controlled in subsequent years under Zia when he was the army chief. If what another commenter here has mentioned is true that Zia was the only senior officer present in Dhaka that day, then it was his responsibility along with Gen. Shafiullah.
jyoti Reply:
November 23rd, 2009 at 11:53 am
All the senior officers — Shafiullah, Zia, Khaled, Khalil (BDR), Nuruzzaman and Tofail (Rakkhi Bahini), AK Khondoker (Air Force), Shafat Jamil (GOC 46 Infantry) — were present in Dhaka that day.
I don’t think ‘like the coup was controlled in subsequent years under Zia’ is valid here. The most serious attempt he put down was in Oct 77, when a Japan Airlines plane was hijacked to Dhaka, and while negotiations continued, Taher’s followers allegedly plotted a 7 Nov style uprising. Once the JAL plane was secured, scores (by some account hundreds) of suspected plotters were summarily executed. Not only do I oppose summary executions under any circumstances, I don’t think anyone was in a position to enforce something like that while Faruq-Rashid controlled the tanks.
There is another parallel that we can think about. After Zia’s assassination, Ershad (with the imprimatur of Sattar)issued an ultimatum against Manzur’s rebel troops. It seems that this was the approach Khaled Mosharraf tried in November. But again, there are questions of logistics. How do you disarm rebel soldiers with tanks in a densely populated city? As it happened, Faruq-Rashid backed down when the MiGs flew. What if they hadn’t?
And that’s the other reason Pilkhana is relevant. In both these cases (plus when Ershad confronted Manzur), we are talking about the risk of a serious firefight (in Nov 75, fighters vs tanks) in civilian settlements.
(It occurs to me that in addition to being labelled pro-Indian, Jamaati, and censor, I am opening myself to the charge of being pro-Ershad.)
tacit Reply:
November 23rd, 2009 at 7:56 pm
In for a penny, in for a pound.
Asif Reply:
November 23rd, 2009 at 9:37 pm
Avoiding firefight in the middle of city was not the only reason military intervention was delayed in Pilkhana. It was one of the reasons, rather. Hostage issues, spreading of the revolt countrywide were the other ones to name a few.
jyoti Reply:
November 24th, 2009 at 4:44 am
True. There were other reasons for delaying military action in Pilkhana, one being the risk of a countrywide mutiny.
As it happens, Khaled Mosharraf’s eventual ouster of Mushtaq did set of a widespread mutiny. The kind of anti-officer violence we saw in Pilkhana happened on 6-8 November around many cantonments, with slogans like ’shipahi shipahi bhai bhai officer er rokto chai’ (source: any book on 7 Nov). Interestingly, organisers of the 7 Nov mutiny used, among other things, the following as propaganda:
- Khaled was a ‘Mujibist and Indian puppet’, citing a march to 32 Dhanmondi attended by his brother (later AL MP Rashed Mosharraf) and mother
- a letter allegedly written by Tajuddin asking India to invade (Enayetullah Khan of Holiday claimed to have seen the paper, but years later confirmed that this was a false allegation).
You see, when the eventual military action came to ’set things right’, it was undone by other forces. The lesson I take away is, it’s all too easy for us to say ‘this or that should have been done’, but without condoning anything, when we reflect on why this or that might not have been done, things start looking lot more dicey.
And here is another parrallel with Pilkhana. Tiktiki posted some comments allegedly from agrieved army officers few weeks ago. The comments ascribe ill motive to the government (AL is RAW agent to destroy army etc etc). Just like it is wrong to question the motivation/intention of the current PM on Pilkhana, I think it is dangerously wrong to automatically ascribe ill motive to those who didn’t move against the killers in 1975. Much like everything else in Bangladesh, it is rare to have a balanced, nuanced discussion on this difficult stage in our history. Can’t UV be the exception?
jyoti Reply:
November 23rd, 2009 at 2:46 am
Zafa, you are missing my point.
I asked a number of questions on who should have done what after 15 Aug. The parrallel with Pilkhana is this: in 2009, there is a person on whom you can squarely pin the responsibilty. This wasn’t the case in 1975. And that’s why, the answer to Tacit’s very important point about responsibility is difficult to answer. And yet, it is that point which is getting completely overshadowed by the Zia discussion.
You can continue with Zia. I am done.
[Reply]
Asif Reply:
November 23rd, 2009 at 11:17 am
http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=111646
The Supreme Court yesterday described the then army chief Maj Gen (retd) KM Shafiullah as a coward for failing to take effective measures to save Bangabandhu on August 15, 1975, and a liar for misleading about his telephone conversation with Bangabandhu.
The apex court denounced Shafiullah for not taking any effective step to save Bangabandhu even after Bangabandhu had phoned him to send force to resist the attack.
It termed him a liar for providing false information about the time of the telephone conversation between him and Bangabandhu on the day of the heinous killing of Bangabandhu and most of his family members.
The five-member full bench of the Appellate Division headed by Justice Md Tafazzul Islam made the comments following submissions of advocate Abdur Razzaque Khan, counsel for Bangabandhu murder convict Sultan Shahriar Rashid Khan.
It was the 17th day of hearing on the appeals of five convicts against their death sentence.
Razzaque told the court that a few army personnel, who played roles during the incidents of August 15, 1975, are now in the custody while some are witnesses and others silent audience. He said those who gave directions and coordinated the killings are now out of the scene.
When the assailants entered his house, Bangabandhu made phone calls to different offices, including the Gonobhaban, Bangabhaban and Rajarbagh police control room, but nobody received the calls, Razzaque said.
Bangabandhu sought assistance from the then army chief Shafiullah over telephone saying the army had attacked his house and perhaps they killed his son Sheikh Kamal. Bangabandhu asked Shafiullah to send forces to his house to resist the attack.
Shafiullah replied, “Sir, can you get out of the house? Let me see what I can do for you.” This cannot be a statement of an army chief and is not acceptable, Razzaque said.
He quoted the statements of Shafiullah, saying the telephone conversation between Bangabandhu and Shafiullah took place sometime before 5:00am on August 15, 1975. Shafiullah then ordered Col Shafayat Jamil, then chief of 46 Brigade, and Rakkhi Bahini officials to save Bangabandhu. Shafiullah then telephoned Bangabandhu at 6:00am but the call was not received.
He said that the army chief did not know what his forces were doing on August 15, 1975, and such statement is “nothing but a farce”.
At this stage the court asked the lawyer what benefit his client might get from the allegation against the then army chief. Perhaps the army chief was a “coward” or a “liar” or he did not want any bloodshed, it said.
Of those who gave directives and coordinated the incidents of August 15, 1975, Razzaque said the then chief of general staff of the army Brigadier Khaled Mosharraf had played a role at that time. The then BDR chief Khalilur Rahman was appointed the chief of defence staff and Sultan Shahriar Rashid Khan was appointed a staff under him on the day of the killings.
All of them played almost similar roles on August 15, 1975, but Sultan Shahriar cannot be accused in this case since he was not physically present at the place of occurrence, argued Shahriar’s counsel.
The allegation of hatching the conspiracy to kill Bangabandhu cannot be brought against Sultan Shahriar, he added.
He said the word “conspiracy” is mentioned several times in the High Court verdicts, but the names of the conspirators are not mentioned. There is no charge of criminal conspiracy against his client, he added.
The lawyer said declaration of the martial law is always illegal and unconstitutional. The full statements and evidence of this case should be reviewed so that such incidents cannot take place further.
The Appellate Division adjourned the hearing until 9:30am today.
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Can we really explain Aug 15 ,1975 without analyzing 1971 ? Was Sheikh Mujib in synch with happenings of 1971? Did he really know what happened in 1971 ? Well it’s on the record that Tajuddin tried several times to brief Sheikh Mujib, but apperantly he was not interested. The fact that Sheikh Mujib backed Mushtaq for a powerful berth in the cabinet and party ,probably tells us Sheikh Mujib’s understanding of Liberation War. What prompted Sheikh Mujib to fire Tajuddin, who led the Liberation War so successfully ? We all know that Mujib Bahini leaders backed Mushtaq in his bid to remove Tajuddin thru No Confidence motion during 1971. Some of the Mujib Bahini leaders were close to Mushtaq . And few of them were of course leaders of 7th Nov Biplob !!! Were Zia and Mushtaq or the Mujib Bahini Leaders in the same camp in 1971 ? The answer is No. Mujib Bahini leaders never accepted Tajuddin led govt that backed Zia’s forces. Zia may have seized the available opportunity in 1975 left open by other players ! Didn’t he seize one of the prized moment of our history that made him a hero ? What will help us preventing another 1/11 is if we really understand how the Struggle turned to a War , how we won the WAR, how OUR dreams came true.
[Reply]
Tacit,
It is not appropriate to conclude that “Sheikh Shaheb was “over-exulting” and ignored warning because “the times were good”. To put it very simply, time was far from being “good” in the 3 years and 8 months of Mujib’s administration. It was indeed a very difficult period. The country was struggling to get its feet on solid ground. Infra structures destroyed during the war being rebuilt slowly. There was massive food crisis following the worst famine of 1974, resulting in a death of 1.5 million Bangladeshis (ref Banglapedia).
Mujib was gullible in the sense that he had an unusually generous mind. He was indeed egregiously blinded by crooks within his own circle, and failed to eradicate massive corruption. He decided to lay his energy on building the country, instead of fending foes. In the hindsight, he should have known better. But even a keen ruler like Caeser was assassinated by a close confidante Brutus who was like a son to him. Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her trusting body guard of many years. What reason did Mujib have to think some unknown army officers were going to kill his wife and son and daughters in-law?
What exactly do you mean by “In a sense, it is of lesser importance to pinpoint those who pumped all those bullets in Sheilh Mujib, Begum Mujib, and their family members?” There are theories that outside forces (that were against the liberation of Bangladesh since 1971) were on the ground and could have played a vital role in instigating the bloody coup (ref Lawrence Lifschulz’s Bangladesh). I am among those who believe strongly in that theory. Nixon-Kissinger admin saw Bangladesh’s independence as a potential gain of the communist regime. The secularism of our constitution was perceived as de-Islamization of the nation, and fueled to the fire that Mujib needed to be stopped at any cost.
[Reply]
tacit Reply:
November 23rd, 2009 at 12:57 am
I did not call Sheikh Mujib over-exulting; that adjective was directed to the people he governed. From what I understand, Indira Gandhi’s assassination was the response to the crackdown on the Golden Temple in Amritsar; her assassins were Sikh and an anti-Sikh progrom swept Delhi after she was killed. Caesar was also famously unconcerned about his personal safety; in the midst of the transformation of the Roman Republic to the Roman Empire, he dismissed his personal bodyguards, leaving him defenceless when his killers surrounded him.
What did I mean by “lesser importance?” I meant that after being surrounded for six hours, when no organs of the state came forward to save the president despite his repeated entreaties, they were in fact condemning him to his death. I don’t think I was endorsing the theory that you mentioned.
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zafa noor Reply:
November 23rd, 2009 at 2:38 am
re: your other comment…
Of course not aided and abetted in the legal sense of the term. I don’t know what the legal term is for someone who helps self confessed murders flee the country, evade prosecution, and install them in state sponsored lucrative diplomatic positions.
[Reply]
zafa noor Reply:
November 23rd, 2009 at 7:40 am
Disagree. I didn’t miss your point; I didn’t think it held a lot of water.
Instead of blaming “the massive failure of a civilian govt” for Aug 15 brutal mass murder, let’s blame the insiders who were in on the cruel and calculative plot. I don’t see how you can call it a failure of the govt, when we know that an attack of this nature was not really anticipated, and security was not reinforced. Those who had any suspicion did not stop the mayhem for their own personal selfish political gains.
BTW Jyoti, your attempt to constrict the avenue of discussion is the kind of attitude that kept me away from UV for over two years. Strictly personal issue.
[Reply]
jyoti Reply:
November 23rd, 2009 at 9:09 am
Zafa, I don’t know what you mean by my attempt to ‘constrict the avenue of discussion’. Show me a single occassion where I have called anyone name, accused anyone’s motives, told anyone that their views have no place in UV or anywhere else? I don’t think you will be able to, because I have never done it. So what do you mean by ‘constrict the avenue of discussion’?
I am sincerely sorry if I’ve offended your feelings. But please don’t suggest that I have kept you or anyone else away from UV by ‘constricting the avenue of discussion’. It is grossly inaccurate at best.
As far as I am concerned, you can have any discussion with anyone on anything you wish. There is no reason to give any weight to my opinions.
I was thinking about Asif Bhai’s comments about how those who appreciate this verdict also cannot rationalize all the actions mentioned in Motiur Rahman’s Prothom Alo op-ed. I have independently read of most of the things that Motiur Rahman writes about, but I’d still like to see the source of some of his claims, especially the one regarding hundreds of Bangladeshi youths being trained in Libya. But, for the purpose of this comment, I accept that everything he said was true.
From what I understand, these are some of the challenges the Zia regime faced: Kader Siddiqi was threatening armed insurrection in the Bangladesh-India border, along with thousands of other fellow warriors, and was quite a serious threat until Morarji Desai’s government stopped supporting them. ( http://bdnews24.com/details.php?id=147425&cid=35&aoth=1 ) Similarly, Shanti Bahini was being built up and trained by Indian forces under the direct patronage of Mrs. Gandhi. ( http://www.bdnews24.com/details.php?cid=2&id=146560 ) Again, only Morarji Desai’s ascension to power stopped the Shanti Bahini insurrection from being much worse. (Seriously, someone should name something in Dhaka after Morarji Desai.) And then of course, there were the domestic problems, some of which Zafa Noor mentioned earlier.
Faruq-Rashid had caused at least two attempted military uprisingss in Bangladesh, in 1976 and 1980. Doubtless, they attempted a lot of other things too.
They could have somehow been tried, either after being extradited back home or in absentia. Someone correct me on this if I am wrong, but by the time Zia had consolidated his power and held parliamentary elections, I believe most of the killers were again outside BD. Keeping them in embassies at least kept them close at hand, where the government could monitor their activities to some extent. The other option was letting them go rogue beyond any sort of monitoring of the government in Dhaka. Much as they have done now.
So, I can rationalize the actions that kept them out of Bangladesh, but in some sort of government establishments such as embassies where they could still be tracked and monitored. I cannot rationalize letting them participate in elections, either in 1986 or in 1996. Or not having any criminal case against them until 1996.
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tacit Reply:
November 23rd, 2009 at 11:38 am
Reading my comment, I think I should emphasize, not only can I not rationalize letting them participate in elections, but the moment at least one of the major planners (Faruq, Rashid, Dalim etc.) were in Bangladesh, they should have been arrested and the murder case initiated against them. Letting them live in BD unmolested also cannot be rationalized.
[Reply]
Regarding Zafa Noor’s Comment in response to my comment,
A. Which action of Zia after the coup showed he aided and abetted the killers? If that is true how he is not an accused in the murder trial?
B. Damage to the constitution was done by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman by making Bangladesh an autocratic one party state. Zia fixed that flaw in constitution. Indemnity was introduced by Awami League government led by Khondokar Mustaque when the army chief was Khaled Mosharraf and Zia was under house arrests. Later indemnity bill was passed by the elected parliament in which Awami League was present as the main opposition.
C. So you have agreed that you were WRONG in saying that BDR massacre was orchestrated by military personnel. Fair enough.
D. So what are you saying? Did not Hasina return to Bangladesh under Zia’s rule? Then who came on that evening and in the following weeks took over the road 32 house and other stuffs in that house from the Governmnet? If Zia said that their lives would be in jeopardy on whose assurance Hasina returns to Bangladesh under ZIa’s rule?
E. Your statement is absolutely wrong. We were talking about press freedome, now you are diverting to these songs. OK lets talk about them then. Those songs used not to be played in government run media and Mujb name was seldom pronounced in state media. But press was free. All non government print media could write whatever they wanted to write to protray Mujib’s contribution. Again, go look at print media of those days, pick up an issue of 26th March, 16th December or 15th August. You will find how braodly Mujib was covered. And there was no ban on those songs. On 15th August, on 26th March, 16th December etc, those songs used to play along with Mujib’s 7th March speech in each corner of Dhaka and elsewhere in the country. Even several Bangla movies released during Zia’s rule has part of Mujib’s 7th March speech and some of those songs.
F. Yes both agree that both BNP and Awami League distorted history and text books to protray their leader in a more favorable way.
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I just want to mention about Zia’s visit to Mujib without my comment.
I am so sorry that right this moment I donot remember the source. But I am almost sure that I have read somewhere this account.
Zia went to Mujib not alone. Toffayel Ahmed was with him. Zia put up the point that he could serve better if power like the chief was laid in his hand.
Mujib answered straight that it was a political dicission to make Shafiullah the chief.
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